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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

THE THIRTEEN PRAGMATISMS. II.

THE purpose of this paper, as indicated at the beginning of the former instalment, is to discriminate all the more important doctrines going under the name of pragmatism which can be shown to be not only distinct, but also logically independent *inter se*. Three such divergent pragmatist contentions have thus far been noted. "Pragmatism" was primarily a theory concerning the "meaning" of propositions; but this theory, because of a latent ambiguity in its terms, breaks up into two: (1) The meaning of a proposition consists in the future consequences in experience which it (directly or indirectly) predicts as about to occur, no matter whether it be believed or not; (2) The meaning of a proposition consists in the future consequences of believing it. The first of these was seen to suggest (though it by no means necessarily implies) the third variant of pragmatism, namely, a doctrine concerning the nature of truth; viz., that the truth of a proposition is identical with the occurrence of the series of experiences which it predicts, and can be said to be known only after such series is completed. "Its truth is its verification." This contention, that judgments acquire truth only in the degree in which they lose predictive character and practical bearings, has been shown to be wholly barren and useless, since it affords no answer to the real epistemological question concerning the criterion of the truth of propositions whose specific predictive implications have not yet been experienced.

4. It is, however, not difficult to see through what associations of ideas some pragmatists have been led to emphasize this notion of the *ex post facto* character of all truth. Largely, it would appear, it derives its plausibility from its resemblance to the ordinary empirical doctrine that those general propositions are to be regarded as true which, so far as they have been applied, have been found to be realized in past experience. This latter doctrine, from which the former is often not clearly distinguished, may be set down as another of the things that pragmatism is frequently supposed to be. It is the doctrine sometimes sententiously expressed by the observa-

tion that those propositions are true which "will work" or "which you can live by." What the evolutionary empiricists who are fond of this observation almost always really mean by it, is that those judgments are true which hitherto *have* worked; in other and more precise words, that I am, in advance of the actual realization or verification of the future experiences which may be predicted by a given judgment, entitled to regard it as true if it is *similar* to, or is a special application of, a general *class* of judgments which my memory tells me have thus far had their implied predictions realized. But this is by no means identical with the principle mentioned in the preceding instalment, and vigorously insisted upon by some pragmatists, that each *individual* judgment can *become* true only through, and contemporaneously with, the presentation in consciousness of those specific subsequent experiences which it points to and prognosticates.

5. If, now, we are to set down this evolutionary empiricist criterion of truth as one expression of pragmatism—at least as that is popularly understood—it is necessary to add that this formula, too, suffers from ambiguity, and therefore breaks up into two quite distinct criteria. The ambiguity is analogous to that already pointed out in the pragmatist's theory of meaning. A belief may "work" in two very different senses, either by having its actual predictions fulfilled, or by contributing to increase the energies or efficiency or chance of survival of those who believe it. The Jews, for example, believed persistently for many centuries that a national Messiah would come in the next generation to restore the independence and establish the supremacy of Israel. In one sense, this belief did not work; for the events which it predicted did not occur. But biologically considered it worked wonderfully well; for it assuredly did much to produce the extraordinary persistency of the Jewish racial character, and the exceptional energy, self-confidence, and tenacity of purpose of the individual Jew. Many beliefs involving false predictions are biologically unfavorable, namely, if they lead to physical conduct ill adapted to the conditions of the believer's physical environment. You can not "live by" the belief that fire will not burn. But, also, some false or never-realized predictions, and many beliefs having apparently no predictive character—and no capacity for empirical verification—have shown themselves to be excellent things to live by. And if we are to take the doctrine that the true is the "livable" in its second and more unquestionably pragmatistic sense—if we are to identify the validity of beliefs with their biological serviceableness—we should apparently have to classify as "true" many judgments which pre-

dict nothing, and many which confessedly predict what is not going to occur.

6. Partly, however, what I have called the theory of the *ex post facto* nature of truth is a somewhat blurred reflection of a certain metaphysical doctrine, which, although not always very explicitly put forward, appears to me to have a rather fundamental place in the characteristic mode of thought of most representatives of pragmatism. This is the doctrine of the real futurity or "open-ness" of the future, and of the determinative or "creative" efficacy of each "present" moment in the ever-transient process of conscious judgment, choice, and action. The two parts of the doctrine obviously enough go together: if the process truly brings into being at each new moment a genuinely new and unique increment of reality, then, so long as any moment's increment has not yet been brought forth, it can not yet be called in any intelligible sense real; and if, similarly, the thing that is to be is a sheer nonentity until it enters into actual, temporal experience, the moment in which it becomes an experience must be credited with the creation "*ex nihilo*" of a new item of being. This doctrine of what M. Bergson calls a *devenir réel*, and of the creative function of consciousness, which is the pregnant ontological preconception from which a great variety of confused pragmatistic ideas have proceeded, unquestionably has certain epistemological implications. Such a metaphysics appears to imply the partial contingency and (from the standpoint of any "present" knowledge) indeterminateness of the future content of reality. But these implications are not synonymous with the *ex post facto* theory of truth in the generality with which that has usually been expressed. The future may be—and by the same pragmatists, when they adumbrate this sort of metaphysics, apparently is—regarded as presenting to our understanding only a narrow margin of the unpredictable; its general character, and the greater mass of its content, may be supposed, without departing from the conception in question, to be predetermined by the accumulated and crystallized results of reality up to date, of which any possible future and novel increment of being must be the child, and to which it must be capable of accommodation. And at all events, there is nothing in this sort of thoroughgoing metaphysical temporalism which justifies the denial of the possibility of the making of "true" judgments about contemporaneous or past (but not yet consciously verified) realities.

7. It is a frequently repeated observation of pragmatists, in moments when they are more mindful of the psychological than of the metaphysical antecedents of their diversely descended conceptions, that the true, in its most generalized character, is "the satis-

factory"; it is, says James, that which "gives the maximal combination of satisfactions." Or, in Perry's careful formulation—with an amendment which we have recently been told, upon good authority, would make it entirely acceptable to a pragmatist—"the criterion of the truth of knowledge is the satisfying character of the practical transition from cognitive expectation to fulfillment, or the resolution of doubt into practical immediacy."¹ Now this doctrine which identifies the truth with the satisfactoriness of a given judgment may mean any one of three things. It may, in the first place, be a simple psychological observation—from which, I fancy, few would dissent—indicating the *genus* of feelings of which the "emotion of conviction" is a species. To doubt, to inquire, to have before the mind certain potential material of judgment that is not yet accepted as true, is, of course, to experience dissatisfaction; a specific sense of discomfort and of non-fulfillment is the emotional concomitant of the doubting or the deliberative moment, and is doubtless the principal spring which prompts men's search for truth. And to believe, to hold true, whatever more it may be, is always at least to be satisfied in some degree with one's mental content of the moment, to find it good, or at all events not so bad as some contrary judgment which, for its sin of insufficient satisfyingness, has been shut away into the outer darkness of non-acceptance.

8. But this psychological truism, that to pass from doubt to belief is to pass from dissatisfaction to a relative satisfaction, is quite a different thing from the first of the pragmatist epistemological contentions that appear to be based upon it. This asserts that the way to determine whether a proposition is true is to apply the test of "satisfyingness"; and to apply it directly and *simpliciter*. There is, according to this version of the nature of truth, to be no attempt to determine the differentia which distinguishes the species "conviction" from the genus "satisfaction," or the subspecies "highest discoverable type of certitude" from "conviction" in general; and there is to be no arranging of satisfactions in a hierarchy and no pretension to define the conditions under which a maker of rational judgments *ought* to be satisfied. From many expressions of pragmatist writers it would appear that, while the term "satisfaction" is "many dimensional," one dimension is as good as another; and that the final and decisive warrant for belief—the mark of the valid judgment—is the capacity of the judgment to yield the maximum bulk of satisfaction, measured indifferently in any of its dimensions. But since the dimensions *are* many, it may manifestly turn out that the greatest total volume may not give the potential maximum of any given dimension taken singly. The liking

¹ A. W. Moore, in this JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 576.

for luminosity of meaning, or for conceptual consistency, or for completeness of empirical verification, may fail to get full satisfaction in a judgment; but the judgment may, it would seem, still be "true," if it compensates for these limitations by a preponderant satisfactoriness with reference to other desires or interests: by its congruency with our habitual ways of belief, or its charm for the imagination, or its tendency to beget a cheerful frame of mind in those who accept it.

I think it possible that some pragmatists may at this point protest that they know of no one who seriously holds this view; certainly, it appears to me to be a curious view to hold. But I think one is justified in calling upon all of the name who reject this doctrine to take (and faithfully observe) an oath to abstain from a fashion of language which they have much affected; to refrain from identifying the true with the satisfactory *simpliciter*, to cease speaking of satisfaction as a "*criterion*" of validity, and to confine their assimilation of the two concepts to the much more qualified and commonplace thesis which follows.

9. This is pragmatism number seven *plus* a more or less explicit admission that our "theoretic" satisfactions have a special character and special epistemological pretensions; that our "intellectual" demands—for clear meanings, for consistency, for evidence—are *not*, and can not be, satisfied, unless their peculiar claim to precedence in the determination of belief is recognized; and that this claim is a legitimate one, to which men should (though they often do not) subordinate their impulse to accept any conclusions that have any kind of satisfactoriness. According to this view, "satisfaction" is still insisted upon as an essential mark of the apprehension of "truth"; but it is precisely a satisfaction which is not to be had except upon condition that other possible satisfactions be ignored or, in many cases, flatly rejected. Between this and the preceding (eighth) doctrine some pragmatist writers seem to waver. James, for example, often uses expressions (some of which have been quoted in the two foregoing paragraphs) implying the doctrine of the commensurability and equivalence of all satisfactions. But he elsewhere (*e. g.*, in a controversy with Joseph in *Mind*, 1905) expressly distinguishes the "theoretic" from the "collateral" satisfactions connected with the processes of judging thought; and he does not appear to deny that the former may conflict with the latter, or that, in the event of such conflict, they ought to be preferred. To the objection, offered by his critic, that if such admissions be made the pragmatist's criterion of validity is not practically distinguishable from the intellectualist's, James opposes nothing more relevant than a sketch of the genesis and evolution of the demand of the human mind for

consistency.² This sketch purports to show—if I understand it—that the desire (more characteristic of some minds than of others) to avoid self-contradiction is historically engendered through the crystallization of repeated experiences of uniformity in “things” into fixed subjective habits of expecting specific uniformities—habits so fixed that when such an expectation is disappointed “our mental machinery refuses to run smoothly.” How the transition from the idea of uniformity to that of consistency is accomplished here, remains obscure to me; but even supposing the evolution of the one into the other to be completely and convincingly traced, these interesting historical speculations do not show, they do not even tend to suggest, that the demand for consistency in our judgments, as we now find it—playing its captious and domineering role among our mental cravings—is not quite distinct from all its fellows and their rightful, though their often flouted, overlord. In the present sense, then, the pragmatist’s criterion of truth, whether right or wrong, seems entirely destitute of any distinctive character; it is simply the old, intellectualist criterion, supplemented by the psychologically undisputable, but the logically functionless, remark that, after all, a “theoretic” satisfaction is a kind of satisfaction.

10. Another pragmatism, and one that undoubtedly has real epistemological bearings, is the doctrine of radical empiricism conjoined with the doctrine of the necessity and legitimacy of postulation; the doctrine, in other words, that “axioms are postulates” and that postulates are as valid as any human judgment ever can be, provided they be the expression of a genuine “practical” need. This may look like our eighth kind of pragmatism over again, expressed in other terms; but in certain important particulars it is really a distinct theory. It contains, in the first place, a special negative contention: namely, that there are no strictly compulsive or “necessary” general truths, no universal propositions that can force themselves upon the mind’s acceptance apart from an uncoerced act of voluntary choice. And on its positive side, it identifies the true, not with those judgments which slip so easily into the mind that they afford a present emotional state of satisfaction, but with those that man’s active nature requires as working presuppositions to be followed in its reaction upon present experience and its instinctive endeavor to shape future experience. This doctrine seems to me to be quite unequivocally expressed by Schiller in a well-known essay in “Personal Idealism.” “The ‘necessity’ of a postulate,” we are told, “is simply an indication of our need. We want it, and so must have it, as a means to our ends. Thus its necessity is that of intelligent, purposive volition, not of psychical, and still less of physical,

² *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XIV., p. 196.

mechanism." "Behind the 'can't' there always lurks a 'won't'; the mind can not stultify itself, because it will not renounce conceptions it needs to order its experiences. The feeling of necessity, therefore, is at bottom an emotional accompaniment of the purposive search for means to realize our ends."³

11. A kindred but a much less thoroughgoing doctrine seems to constitute one of the pragmatisms of James. The author of "The Will to Believe" would, I suppose, still vigorously deny the possibility of reaching "necessary" conclusions with respect to many issues, including some of the greatest importance in relation both to the purely utilitarian requirements of our living and to our higher interests; and he would, clearly, still maintain the propriety and the practical inevitableness of voluntary postulation in such cases. But that there are *some* truly coercive and indubitable truths, some items of *a priori* knowledge inhering in the native constitution of a rational mind, James pretty fully and frankly declares, in his recently published volume of lectures. "Our ready-made ideal framework for all sorts of possible objects follows from the very structure of our thinking. We can no more play fast and loose with these abstract relations than we can with our sense experiences. They coerce us; we must treat them consistently, whether or not we like the results."⁴ This, obviously, is no doctrine that axioms are postulates, or that behind every "can't" there lies a "won't"; it is the doctrine that axioms are necessities and that the action of voluntary choice in belief is always limited by a permanent system of *a priori* principles of possibility and impossibility inhering in the nature of intellect, at least as intellect is now evolved. It is compatible, at most, with the opinion that there are not so numerous, nor so useful, axioms as some dogmatic philosophers have supposed, and that, when axioms fail us, postulates must in many cases be resorted to.

12. A point of pragmatist doctrine separable from (though not inconsistent with) either of the two last mentioned, is the assertion of the *equal* legitimacy of those postulates (such as the uniformity of causal connection, the general "reliability" of nature, and the like) which appear indispensable as presuppositions for effective dealing with the world of our physical experience, and of those which, though lacking this sort of "physical" necessity as completely as they do the logical sort, yet seem demanded in order to give meaning to, or encouragement in, men's moral strivings, or to satisfy the emotional or esthetic cravings of our complex nature. It is conceivable enough that some pragmatists should refuse to recognize the equal standing of these two classes of postulates, should

³Schiller, "Axioms as Postulates," § 11, in "Personal Idealism."

⁴James, "Pragmatism," p. 211.

accept the first while rejecting the second; and it is a fact that not all who find a place for both agree as to the number and range of the second sort. The more extremely liberal forms of the doctrine of the right to postulate freely and to treat postulates as truths, tend to lapse into identity with the eighth variety of pragmatism, which identifies the true with the "maximally satisfying"; but in its more cautious and critical forms, the argument from the practical inevitableness of certain scientific to the legitimacy of certain ethico-religious postulates must be regarded as a distinct type of pragmatist epistemology, and perhaps the one which—if pragmatism ought to have practical bearings—best deserves the name.

13. Lastly, there remains a second pragmatist theory of the *meaning* of concepts or judgments—which brings us back to the topic, though by no means to precisely the doctrine, with which our enumeration began. It may be expressed thus: an essential part of our idea of any object or fact consists in an apprehension of its relation to some purpose or subjective interest on our part; so that no object of *thought* whatever could be just what, for our thought, it *is*, except through the mediation of some idea of purpose or some plan of action. The language of some pragmatist writers might lead one to suppose that they consider the *whole* meaning to be reducible to this teleological reference; but such a view does not seem to me intelligible, and it does not appear certain that any one really intends to maintain it. But it is evident that there are several logicians who think it both true and important to declare that a relation to a purpose constitutes an intrinsic and a determinative element in the connotation of any notion. It is, I suppose, such a principle that Moore intended to illustrate in recently pointing out that, however objective the virtues of a given candidate for office may be, he could neither be "clean" nor a candidate were there not present in the mind of every one so representing him the idea of possible voting to be done. And I suppose the same view is, in part, at least, what Schiller has sought to enforce in these columns, in insisting that nobody can be "lost" except with the aid of the existence in the universe of some purpose in some mind, requiring the presence of the "lost" person (or of the persons from whom he is lost) in some place or relation from which he is (or they are) excluded by virtue of his "lostness."⁵ Schiller appears to me to have entangled this theory of meaning in a confusing and illegitimate manner with questions about "truth" and "reality"; but to pursue this distinction would involve a somewhat long and complicated analysis, which may not here be undertaken.

These thirteen pragmatisms have been set down, not in a topical

⁵ This JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 42, and pp. 483, 488.

order, but according to the leading of those associations of ideas through which the ambiguities of the several doctrines, and the transitions from one to another, become relatively intelligible. But it may be useful to arrange them here in a more logical manner, while still retaining the original numbering. Those forms of theory, the separate enumeration of which results from distinctions made by this paper, but overlooked by pragmatist writers themselves—in other words, the doctrines formulated by pragmatists in more or less equivocal terms—are indicated by the sign (*a*); each group of doctrines hitherto improperly treated as single and univocal has a common superior number:

I. *Pragmatist Theories of Meaning.*

1. The “meaning” of any judgment consists wholly in the future consequences predicted by it, whether it is believed or not (*a*¹).

2. The meaning of any judgment consists in the future consequences of believing it (*a*¹).

13. The meaning of any idea or judgment always consists in part in the apprehension of the relation of some object to a conscious purpose (*a*¹).

II. *Pragmatism as an Epistemologically Functionless Theory concerning the “Nature” of Truth.*

3. The truth of a judgment “consists in” the complete realization of the experience (or series of experiences) to which the judgment had antecedently pointed; propositions *are* not, but only *become*, true (*a*²).

III. *Pragmatist Theories of Knowledge, i. e., of the Criterion of the Validity of a Judgment.*

4. Those general propositions are true which so far, in past experience, have had their implied predictions realized; and there is no other criterion of the truth of a judgment (*a*²).

5. Those general propositions are true which have in past experience proven biologically serviceable to those who have lived by them; and this “livableness” is the ultimate criterion of the truth of a judgment (*a*²).

7. All apprehension of truth is a species of “satisfaction”; the true judgment meets some need, and all transition from doubt to conviction is a passage from a state of at least partial dissatisfaction to a state of relative satisfaction and harmony (*a*³).—This is strictly only a psychological observation, not an epistemological one; it

becomes the latter by illicit interpretation into one of the two following.

8. The criterion of the truth of a judgment is its satisfactoriness, as such; satisfaction is "many dimensional," but all the dimensions are of commensurable epistemological values, and the maximum bulk of satisfaction in a judgment is the mark of its validity (a^3).

9. The criterion of the truth of a judgment is the degree in which it meets the "theoretic" demands of our nature; these demands are special and distinctive, but their realization is none the less a kind of "satisfaction" (a^3).

10. The sole criterion of the truth of a judgment is its practical serviceableness as a postulate; there is no general truth except postulated truth, resulting from some motivated determination of the will; "necessary" truths do not exist.

11. There are some necessary truths; but these are neither many nor practically adequate; and beyond them the resort to postulates is needful and legitimate.

12. Among the postulates which it is legitimate to take as the equivalent of truth, those which subserve the activities and enrich the content of the moral, esthetic, and religious life have a coordinate place with those which are presupposed by common sense and physical science as the basis of the activities of the physical life.

IV. *Pragmatism as an Ontological Theory.*

6. Temporal becoming is a fundamental character of reality; in this becoming the processes of consciousness have their essential and creative part. The future is strictly non-real and its character is partly indeterminate, dependent upon movements of consciousness the nature and direction of which can be wholly known only at the moments in which they become real in experience. (Sometimes more or less confused with 3.)⁶

Each pragmatism of the thirteen should manifestly be given a name of its own, if confusion in future discussions is to be avoided. The present writer has neither the necessary ingenuity nor the ambition to devise a nomenclature so extensive. But however the several theories be designated, the fact of their difference, and of the incompatibility of some of them with some others, can hardly, just now, be too much insisted upon—in the interest of pragmatism itself. What the movement commonly so named most needs is a clarification of its formulas and a discrimination of certain sound and important ideas

⁶ It is impossible to bring out the nature, motives, and reciprocal relations of dependence or incompatibility of these theories in any such condensed formulas. I hope no reader will attempt to take the above recapitulation as a substitute for the analytical discussion contained in the preceding paragraphs.

lying behind it from certain other ideas that are sound but not important, and certain that would be important if only they were not unsound. The present attempt to list the chief varieties, and to clear up the hidden ambiguities, of a doctrine nominally one and indivisible, is accordingly offered as a species of *Prolegomena zu einem jeden künftigen Pragmatismus*.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

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DISCUSSION

SUB SPECIE ÆTERNITATIS

IT is worth while for philosophers to ask themselves whether the questions they are talking about are vital and significant, or the opposite. The article by Dr. Bush in a recent number of this JOURNAL raises the question in an interesting form. He there maintains that the significant, the live problems of philosophy do not concern timeless truth, or any reality "sub specie æternitatis," but have to do with straightening out the tangles of this our ever changing human experience. When philosophers take over ancient problems which arose in other ages of culture and life, and deal with them as if they were the really pressing problems of philosophy, they are dealing only with "secondary," defunct problems. Their task is no longer vital.

There is certainly much in this essentially pragmatic treatment of the great historic problems of metaphysics to commend it to our overpragmatic culture. Yet we may well hesitate to accept the doctrine completely.

Suppose we turn from the questions of metaphysics to those of science. Now I take it that a scientist believes that he is getting at the veritable constitution and structure of some sort of "reality." His problem arises because the reality presented to his experience can not be made to square with some system of concepts previously accepted as valid, in other words, because it can not be completely rationalized. And we are here interested in pointing out that the problems of science which arose in former periods of culture are not meaningless or insignificant to-day. Their formulation may have been inadequate because less was then known about that reality—"that experience," if you please—which set the problems then, and still sets them.

Moreover, the scientist believes that *while the reality studied may be subject to flux and development, yet the system of truths about*